SYRIAN CHEMICAL ATTACK
Introduction
One incident affiliated with bioterrorism and chemical attacks occurred in Syria on April 7, 2018, affecting individuals in the city of Douma (Flatner, 2020). The aftermath revealed that at least 50 people succumbed to the deadly chemical attack, with more than 500 suffering immense injuries accrued from the chlorine attacks. The lion’s share of victims’ suffered seizures, foaming at the mouth, chemical burns, cyanosis, not forgetting respiratory distress. As a result, shelter was used as a strategy to avoid further impacts brought about by the chlorine gas. Despite the lethal effects, both the Russian and Syrian governments denied being part and parcel of the attack, although evidence revealed a domestic form of attack using deadly chlorine gas (Flatner, 2020). The purpose of this essay is to address the response system incorporated by the Syrian civil defense, how international management tried to chip in, and the challenges faced concerning the Incident Command System.
Communication in Douma chemical attack
The advent of the attack saw communication being exemplified in Douma, attempting to comprehend the mystery at hand. The media, predominantly electronic and social media, were the common forms of communication systems used in disaster response and mitigation. For example, on April 16, Seth Doane, a journalist at the Columbia Broadcasting System, traveled to Douma after a report by a neighbor citing a choking gas, which smelt like chlorine gas (Flatner, 2020). Here, through the media broadcast, he portrayed the site where the missile remains of the attack rested. Another blogger, Eliot Huggins, showcased open-source evidence of a geographical video insinuating that the attack was perpetrated by two Mi-8 helicopters that dropped chlorine gas after departing from Dumayr Airbase half an hour earlier. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States seconded these reports.
Influence of hindered response
While still on the communication protocols, incidences of intimidation were reported. In other words, the Syrian government attempted to hinder and influence the response emanating from the local civil defense during and after the chemical attack. For this reason, various legal implications were prevalent. One of the witnesses gave a testimony that was brought to the limelight by The Guardian, depicting instances of extreme intimidation on the Syrian officials’ side. The scenario was associated with the medical personnel, who received threats on remaining mute about the treatment state directed towards the patients. Not only were the medics threatened, but also the patients and their families. If any physician left the area, much survey was implemented to ensure that no samples were transported out of the site, demonstrating further evidence regarding attack using lethal chlorine gas. Therefore, the disaster was on the edge of two lines; witnesses remaining dumb or instead denying any occurrence of an attack, while chlorine-filled canisters were still being found in Douma, revealing instances of a rebel attack.
The further implication was leveled towards foreign strategies, like that adopted by the United States. There were prevalent legal and humanitarian implications due to the war crimes existing amongst internationals and civilians. There was much self-deterrence by the perpetrators affecting the judicial, economic, diplomatic, and military response to ensure cost-imposing mitigation was achieved.
Integrating the incident command structure/National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Besides, clinical and hospital systems were integrated into the National Incident Management System (NIMS), or the incident command structure, promoted by the civil defense in Syria. The response from hundreds of victims, therefore, impacted where the attacks had taken place. According to Burgiel (2020), the incident command system is a crucial framework that enhances rapid response if a biological invasion occurs. From the clinical and hospital perspective, the chlorine attack in Syria integrated the National Incident Management System, which helped guide all governmental, non-governmental, and private sectors. Such enhanced a coordinate structure in preventing, protecting, mitigating, responding, and recovering from the Douma incident. Here, NIMS provided various stakeholders in the overall community with processes and systems that successfully delivered capabilities, as illustrated in the National Preparedness System. In other words, it described operational guidelines that guided and defined how the Syrian civil defense would work jointly and effectively during such an attack (Jensen & Thompson, 2016, P. 182).
International emergency management assistance
At the national and international levels, non-governmental organizations were part and parcel of the chemical attack response unit. More so, international emergency assistance played a crucial role in helping and treating those affected by the chlorine attack, despite hindrance in their involvement from Syria’s government. For instance, NGOs and a republic like America helped offer mutual aid to the attack victims by supporting them financially and medically. More so, such organizations helped perpetrate interviews attempting to understand what transpired prior, during, and after the attack. Such actions were paramount in condemning various restrictions performed by the Syrian government, which was at the forefront in covering transparency. Here, medical personnel, victims of the attack, and their families were threatened if they could not deny the lethal chlorine gas. International organizations like the United Nations played an integral and noble role in inducing peace for the government in power and its people. More so, United States, Great Britain, and France were at the forefront in dedicating their help towards the oppositional forces.
Challenges in the Incident Command System (ICS)
Since the Syrian government was critical in hindering non-governmental and international emergency management’s involvement, various challenges were met by such responders in the incident command structure of Syria. The chemical attacks were attributed to the host government, bringing about a further challenge to the Syrian civil defense in establishing a personal Incident Command System. Some of the problems in ICS were attributed to organizational complexity and getting management buy-in. The government of Syria labeled various pitfalls, particularly in attempting to make victims and medics deny the occurrence of lethal chlorine gas attack. Such translated to a making it hard to get a management buy-in based on savings, efficiency, resources, and monetary-based explanations from non-governmental and foreign actors.
Conclusion
The challenge faced by the Syrian chemical attack would have been resonated by integrating a better incident management system. Despite various pitfalls as seen in threats from the Syrian government and a low transparency level on the side of the medics, victims, and families, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) would have helped better guide the private, non-governmental, and governmental sectors to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond and recover from the aftermath of the Douma chemical attack. Such processes are depicted in the National Preparedness System’s various capabilities that define how operational systems ought to work if a chemical, hazardous, or terrorist attack occurs.
References
Burgiel, S. W. (2020). The incident command system: a framework for rapid response to biological invasion. Biological Invasions, 22(1), 155-165. Retrieved: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10530-019-02150-2
Flatner, C. R. (2020). The Battle of Narratives: A comparative framing analysis of the chemical attack in Douma and the Western military strikes in Syria in 2018 (Master’s thesis). Retrieved: https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/80083/33/Masteroppgave-STV4992_v-r-2020_Celina-R-stg-rd-Flatner.pdf
Jensen, J., & Thompson, S. (2016). The incident command system: a literature review. Disasters, 40(1), 158-182. Retrieved: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/disa.12135