Psychopathy
Should Psychopaths be held responsible for criminal acts they commit?
Psychopathy has long been a challenge in our social-liberal societies and their criminal law systems. Psychopathy is a complex human phenomenon that even scientists have not fully explored. It is for this reason that scholars and lawyers have had conflicting views on criminal culpability for psychopaths. Nonetheless, the question begs how we should judge psychopaths. After an extensive literature review, my answer is yes-psychopaths should be criminally punishable for their atrocities. Lacking moral responsibility should not excuse criminal responsibility. Even though this standpoint is contrary to that of many scholars, it is consistent that psychopathy is not diagnosed as insanity; hence, it should retain some criminal responsibility.
Arguably, the main point of contention is on moral responsibility. Available literature from various legal, psychology, and neuroscience positions has tried to build a case around moral knowledge among psychopaths. For instance, Levy (2014) does pose salient points on why psychopaths should be excused based on limited moral knowledge. He argues that psychopaths, while they intend to harm, they are specifically not intending to harm personhood. Just like “normal people” may hurt non-human livings, a psychopath perceives killing a person as crushing a bug. This outlook seeks to explain that people with psychopathy are not prescribed the same moral authority as others, which I oppose as unjustifiable.
Firstly, Levy (2014) does confirm that psychopaths can identify what constitutes a legal or moral violation but cannot understand them as morally wrong. The statement emerging from his argument is that psychopaths have the knowledge but do not believe moral judgments in question. Does that mean psychopaths are blameless because they do not understand the point of morality? Hiding behind a lack of moral understanding and rationality does not subvert the reality that psychopaths indulge in pre-meditated crimes. In any case, psychopathy does not direct action. According to Fox et al. (2013), psychopaths exhibit instrumental aggression in contrast to reactive aggression. Their actions have been evidenced as calculated, subtle, and considerably processed. The proof of forethought exposes an individual who is motivated to accomplish a personal goal regardless of others’ welfare.
It would be pretentious not to acknowledge that psychopaths may have dysfunctional brain systems. Literature has indicated the presence of characteristic deficits among these individuals. For one, empirical studies have shown a deficit in moral/conventional distinction in psychopathy. In the moral/conventional task (MCT), convention transgressions are considered authority-dependent while transgression against morality is authority-independent. Fox et al. (2013) found that most literature consistently reported that psychopaths correctly classified conventional and moral violations separately. The problem is more on authority-independence whereby, regardless of correct classification, they do not appreciate the reasons for making a rule moral (Levy, 2014). However, according to Fox et al. (2013), psychopaths report that both conventional and moral transgressions remain wrong regardless if rules exist against them (an inconsistency compared to children who would accept convention transgression if they are allowed). One would argue that knowing action is undesirable but still going ahead to perform it should prescribe criminal responsibilities for the outcomes.
The theme of empathy is similarly central in trying to answer the aforementioned question. Psychopaths come off as self-serving, ego-centric, and manipulative in their doings. They seem to conduct themselves in utter disregard of others. These traits indicate they may lack the ability to empathize with others. In a normal circumstance, another person’s distress should ideally invoke an emotional response. However, psychopaths pose an affective deficit and diminished aversive conditioning. According to Levy (2014), empathy is a central feature of how moral concepts apply to wrongful actions. The inability to empathize may be prescribed as moral blindness. This argument by Levy (2014) holds a great deal of truth as actions are considered to have high moral content when it responds to moral reasoning, and vice versa. In our topic question, the same argument can be applied in that; psychopaths know the content of the rules they violate. They should have the moral reasons to refrain from violating these laws which are well-known to them. Otherwise, their actions are blameworthy because they know their actions cause distress.
There are those scholars in the school of thought that psychopaths are innately incapable of caring for others, hence should not be accountable for their nature. This notion that psychopaths have a completely attenuated conception of personhood and devoid of normal human emotions does more harm by sheltering criminal behaviours. For instance, Levy (2014) points out that an earlier study done on incarcerated psychopaths was flawed because the subjects had an incentive to show they were reformed. However, this revelation indicates that, even though it may be deemed a hopeful thought, the subjects were ready to follow specific rules to be free. Easily letting off people who plea insanity reduces incentives keeping non-criminal psychopaths from crime. If psychopaths cannot be held accountable based on moral responsibilities, they need to know they are criminally responsible and punishable despite their moral leaning. Furthermore, the purpose of punishment is always deterrence.
Public opinion is that people who harm us in any way or form should show some remorse, especially after being punished. Levy (2014), however, has presented notable reasons why psychopaths ought to be excused. No position is outright correct nor wrong, but the stand that psychopaths should be criminally culpable weighs more on my scale. A person would ask whether it is right imprisoning people who are emotionally ignorant of the consequences of their actions. The fact of the matter is that these psychopaths do not appear to lack control. They mostly engage in instrumental aggression, carefully planned against their victims. Secondly, psychopaths can understand the concept of rules. Otherwise, to ensure a civilized society, rules must not be waivered for anyone (Fox et al., 2013). Most importantly, people’s impaired understanding should not qualify exoneration when harm has been done to another human being. Nonetheless, I am aware psychopaths may not arrive at the same conclusion as everyone else but, as long there are no other viable alternatives, they got to be held criminally responsible.
References
Fox, A., Kvaran, T., & Fontaine, R. (2013). Psychopathy and Culpability: How Responsible Is the Psychopath for Criminal Wrongdoing?. Law & Social Inquiry, 38(01), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01294.x
Levy, N. (2014). Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content. Philosophical Psychology, 27(3), 351-367. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.729485