Polarization: Known and Unknowns
American politics have taken a new turn around. There is great polarization like never seen before. Unlike the 1980s, when polarization scholarship came to the fore, the scale at which polarization studies are conducted has increased. Initially, polarization concerned party politics. Later, beginning in 1991, scholarship on public polarization begun to emerge as well. Such is the 1991 David Jameson’s controversial Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Although, polarization in public has been disputed since then.
In the mid-twentieth century, the status quo began to change with a wave of public awareness becoming more pronounced. Simultaneously, events in the USA’s public policy’s domestic and international realms had a tremendous effect. Vietnam War led to a heated public distaste of the country’s involvement in the war. As stated on page 6, this all changed in the mid-1960s. Turmoil replaced tranquility. America experienced social and political upheaval. Conflict over civil rights and then the Vietnam War left the nation deeply divided. Civil unrest became the order of the day. Such happenings demonstrate divided opinion. Politically, the parties were equally divided amongst themselves. Regardless, the general public opinion was not polarized alongside these party divisions. The divisions are typical of the classification established in chapter one. The rightists and the leftists on extreme ends places usually occupied by party politics. In the middle-ground, the moderates, usually the general public with insignificant affiliation to political parties, take the larger share.
As an effect, the electorate became more issue-oriented and more ideological. The impact of issue preferences in presidential voting increased. Studies of this period confirm the political outlook then…found a good deal more constraint in voters’ issue preferences beginning in the 1964 election, suggesting the electorate’s increased ideological character. Thus, at this level, when polarization comes into being has been established, the difference of when it developed among the political elites and the corresponding knowledge by the public. Thus, the unknowns have been made known by these aspects.
Two theoretical approaches help expound the debate on polarization. The Emerging polarization theory suggests that political polarization in public has substantially grown in recent times. Alongside this polarization is the argument that partisanship has equally become polarized and represents the electorates’ divergent views. In other words, the electorate is divided by political party differences. The differences are entrenched in religious differences, income inequality, and climate change view variations. Besides, the diverging views are at an all-time high. Studies to establish this affirms the claim as well. A November 2010 poll showed that 69% of respondents thought Americans were greatly divided while a paltry 29% thought Americans were generally united in their values. It was based on the following questions. Whether the respondents thought if Americans were united and in agreement about the most important values or if Americans were greatly divided when it comes to the most important values. Nevertheless, the theory derives relevance in the highly acceptable impression that Americans feel they are highly divided. As expresses on page 50, the strength of the emergence theory would seem to be that it conforms to the public’s prevailing impression about the level of polarization in the electorate as well as those of most observers…there is certainly a common sense that Americans are highly polarized, that political differences are unusually heated among average citizens.
The foregoing cannot be less true, given the contemporary American outlook. The last two governments have demonstrated this quite well. The Trump administration sought to overhaul Obama’s policies regardless of whether they held the American values or not. The situation is made worse by their partisan political positions. For instance, Americans’ caring value was risked when trump pulled out the country from the Paris Climate Change agreement. On the other hand, Obama had sought to safeguard the environment based on care and being custodians of the environment. The sense of having the responsibility to care. Additionally, the ongoing disputed presidential election is a grant showing the extent of polarization in American society. The societal values entrenched in institutions such as the electoral process have been eroded. There is a section of Americans who don’t trust these institutions t deliver on behalf of the people.
The no polarization theory counteracts the former. It argues that there has not been a polarization in American society. It argues that the general public has largely remained undisturbed by the extreme polarization by political elites. It suggests that the kind of polarization present in American politics has been around party politics and not the moderate general public. According to this theory, second-order polarization between parties has been mistaken for first-order polarization or general polarization in public. This theory’s significance is that it finds no substantial evidence to suggest that there is a public’s polarization in American society. A close examination of the general population finds little or no sign of a comparable increase in polarization.
The third theory, revealed polarization, takes the line of thought by the emerging theory, only that it offered a change in the time period when polarization took place. It says that polarization occurred in the 1960s and not just in recent times, as espoused by the first theory. This theory draws its strength in the fact that it encapsulates both arguments offered by the first two. By stating that polarization started way back before the time period suggested by the Emerging theory, it acknowledges that polarization has occurred. Additionally, it agrees that historically, the electorate has remained unpolarized amid the highly polarized political parties. Another strength of the revealed polarization theory is that it fits the history of partisanship- a relatively unpopularized electorate accepting relatively heterogeneous parties in the 1950s through 1960s, a more polarized electorate rejecting these same relatively heterogeneous parties in the 1970s, and a popularized electorate accepting more ideologically homogenous parties from the mid-1980s to the present.
Ideology and polarization
The extent and growth of polarization are highly contested. Data from the early twentieth century suggest that people have often taken partisan belonging. Later in the mid-century did the questionnaires become more open-ended, thus providing respondents with options to express their attachment to either of these sides, thus helping to map out the ideological leanings.
Ideologies have been established through various studies over a period of time and at different time periods as well. Through the ideological spectrum, polarization is offered as the percentage of respondents identifying themselves as liberals, conservatives, moderates, and those with unidentified orientation. Generally, the five ideological series establish that there are four major trends across their findings. First, in the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of the electorate had already been fairly polarized. A period in which ANES (American National Election Study) established that about 45% of Americans were neither moderates nor unaware of their ideological perspectives. These studies’ second observation has established that the electorate has become more polarized and less centrist over time. They establish that the ideological portion of the electorate has grown. Individually, the series suggests that there has been a surge of ideological tenets in the electorate. Thirdly, the series establishes that polarization has steadily grown since the 17970s. It shows that polarization was a well-established way before, not just the recent decades, as some studies and the Emerging theory suggestions indicate.
Fourthly, while there is some variation in the pervasiveness of ideological orientations measured by the different series in the 1970s and 1980s and variations as well in the degree to which polarization grew in the intervening years, there is a consensus that nearly three of every five Americans now associate themselves with either a liberal or conservative perspective. Extrapolated, the data shows that by the 1970s, 49% of Americans ascribed to either being liberals or conservatives. The figure increased to 56% in 2012. The ideological portion of the electorate increased by about seven percentage points in 2010. At the same time, the non-ideologicals reduces by the same figure during the same time period. Conclusively, ideologicals increased and outnumbered the non-ideologicals in the time period between1970 to 2010.
Statistical skew due to various errors presented is worth noting. Importantly, the human being as the source and subject of discussion needs serious consideration. These data relied upon the respondents to report about themselves may cause an issue of interest. As noted on page 72, like party identification, issue preferences, and every other piece of information obtained from citizens’ surveys, it is based on what respondents report about themselves, their thinking, and their activities. The same goes for the validity such that these ideological orientations should reflect the preferred presidential candidate. Thus, there ought to be a strong relationship between the self-identified ideologies with the choice of a political party that one affiliate with, choosing the preferred presidential candidate. Evidently, the 2012 presidential elections affirm this claim. This is exactly what we find in 2012 ANES data; among the liberals, 93% identified with the Democratic Party, and the same percentage voted for Democrat Barrack Obama. Among the conservatives, 81% identified with the Republican Party, and 83% voted for Republican Mitt Romney.
Additionally, for the ideology measure to be meaningful, the ANES series is considered the parties and candidate orientations. The data suggest that only 10% of correspondents mischaracterized Obama as a conservative, and about 11% characterized the Democratic party as conservative. On the other hand, only about 14% classified Mitt Romney and the Republican Party as liberal. Thus, this is an insignificant number of correspondents who mischaracterized their classifications. Rather, the majority did classify correctly and hence can be assumed that the data was reliable and, therefore, valid. Hence, in identifying oneself as either of the two, the series confirms that ideology and party orientation are unison. Ideology and polarization are closely tied. The ideology that one holds is likely to be the characteristic measure with which he/she will orient. Therefore, it is evident from the above arguments and analogy of the 2012 presidential elections that ideology and orientation are inseparable.
Circumstantial evidence
The evidence represented by ideology dispositions discussed above, known as issue attitude data, is well elaborated to be accepted as a basis for concluding. Despite its shortcomings, it is the best-developed formulae for determining polarization thus far. Additionally, the political outlook in the American political scene seems to support the issue of attitude data. Eleven instances have been put forth regarding this argument. Covering a period of time then and contemporarily for the essence of a comparative approach. They are One, the highly polarized parties in the electorate in the 2000s. This is evident with the just concluded presidential elections. The Republicans cannot rise above the partisanship divide to condemn the undermining of democratic institutions as they seem to have been overstepped under the Trump regime.
Second, the general agreement that parties in the Electorate were not highly polarized in the 1960s and 1970s. As discussed before, the levels of polarization during this period were substantively low. Thirdly, there is a suggestion that most Americans are partisan, a factor leading to the 2012 presidential elections as earlier discussed. The fourth factor is that partisan increased in the 1980s, which was evidently submitted. Other key pointers include the high polarization of parties in the 2000s and an increase in turnout in the 2000s. The latter is true of the last presidential elections, which marked a record high in its history.
It is imperative that parties can be highly polarized without the correspondence of public polarization as well. This is so because, as presented earlier, the majority of the electorate identifies with partisan politics. Hence, the high partisan figures leaning towards either party depending on the leanings of the electorate.
Why Parties are more polarized
Several hypotheses have been offered in support of the above argument. Gerrymandering argues that the increased party polarization results from the redistricting process, which has become so technical that incumbents are more securely protected in districts redrawn to keep them in office, thwarting serious threats from the opposition. This causes the effect of incumbents voting as they please hence allowing more ideologically extreme voting. Income inequality is also fronted as a basis for polarization, though evidently, it has not had the resultant effect. However, the increased rift between the “haves” and “have nots” in essence suggests that each of these divisions will politically lean towards the party s/he feels well represents one’s interests.
Party ideologies have as well been phenomenal in the polarization process. An acclaimed explanation for increased party polarization is that ideological activists within the parties have had a greater role in steering the parties and have used their influence to pull the parties toward the ideological poles. The media has also been divided on a partisan basis. Pro leftists and pro rightist media have emerged in American politics. Since the 1980s, the news and opinion media segment with strong ideological perspectives has grown…talk radio and cable news networks with definite ideological views have developed large audiences. They have become an important player in national political discourse. Much of the growth is on the political right, as a response to what is regarded as the establishment process’s left-wing tilt. The significant role media has played that… those who tune in are invigorated and reinforced in their views by the ideological message they came to hear.
Polarization and Democracy
The great indifference in American society is tied to the two major party divisions approaches to conflict resolution. This is well put on page 225 as the common thread that ties liberals together is a general predisposition to use government for problem-solving. On the other hand, conservatives are not inclined to use the government for problem-solving. Thus, the government is usually the first resort for liberals while it is the last resort for conservatives to resolve issues.
The resultant effects of this kind of scenario are not safe for democratic dispensation. In the pluralistic politics that foreran the polarized politics of today, Americans were less aware of ideological political issues at hand. And thus, it was the downside of democratic values. The consequential effects of this kind of political set up are varied. For instance, continually reinforced and deeply held polarized convictions can become quite inflexible and unresponsive to compromise. Governance under such an environment can be particularly daunting. Highly polarized opinion becomes difficult for political process management. This is because it produces polarized political statements.
In conclusion, therefore, the issue of polarization has been looked at great lengths. From the time when serious scholarly work emerged about the subject in the mid-twentieth century. The changes that have occurred since then to the contemporary political scene in American society. It is no doubt that polarization is entrenched and is increasingly becoming so in recent times.