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Discussion Post: Evolution of Trust
The Prisoner’s Dilemma dictates that two individuals acting in their self-interests tend not to produce the optimal outcome. On the other hand, the “The Evolution of Trust,” as described by Case (2017), relates to the game theory where trust can be created through co-operation regarding the game theory. As such, the Evolution of Trust connects to the Prisoner’s dilemma with game theory’s common aspect. Additionally, Case (2017) describes that a game of trust is also referred to as the infamous Prisoner’s dilemma. In a repeated game of trust (iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma), Case (2017) insists that it is vital that neither players would know when the last round is. In a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is evident that the story was derived from two suspects that can either squeal on their partner in crime to cheat or co-operate by staying silent.
Chase (2017) concludes the interactive “Evolution of Trust” game with three important takeaways. He suggests that trust keeps a relationship going with repeated interactions, but players need the knowledge of these interactions to build trust. Also, Case (2017) concludes that from the game results, players must be playing a non-zero-sum game where at least both players can be better off, which he describes as a win-win scenario. Last, the game results indicate that building trust will be cumbersome if the level of miscommunication is high. In regards to climate inaction, a Prisoner’s dilemma does exist. Every nation and every individual benefit if others restrain their pollution, but most people prefer not to have to retrain their own as such researchers indicate that tools such as incentives, regulations, treaties, alliances, and taxes, in this case, act as tools to boost communication within the game of trust. By having enough communication and repeated interactions, climate inaction can be eliminated.
Reference
Case, N. (2017, July). The Evolution of Trust. https://ncase.me/trust/