Engineering Ethics: The DC-10 Case
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Engineering Ethics: The DC-10 Case
The DC-10 Case provides a complex historical and political issue that includes machines, persons, laws, accidents, organizations, policies, and institutions. On June 12, 1972, McDonnell Douglas DC-10, a brand new American Airlines, was preparing for takeoff. DC-10 was introduced in 1972 as McDonnell had spent over one billion dollars developing (Litch et al., 2019). A few minutes after 7 pm on June 12, 1972, the plane airlifted from Detroit airport. Minutes after taking off, the plane had risen to about 3500 meters above sea-level. A loud noise was heard as the plane wildly banked to the left as items flew around the cabin with ceiling compartments falling (Litch et al., 2019). The cockpit pilots fought for the jet’s control but to no avail as it lost altitude. McCormick fought for control of the jet and achieved the control by using the thrust on one part of the plane and using the jet’s remaining engines. DC-10 was able to struggle back to the Detroit airport, and with 67 people on board, the plane crashed on the runway at about 300 kilometers per hour. The plane finally came to a stop after veering about 300 meters from the runway (Litch et al., 2019). The crew then investigated the plane and was able to see a huge hole at the back of the plane, as shown in figure one below, and questions were raised on what caused the hole.
Figure 1: DC-10 door remains (Eddy et al., 1976).
Investigations on the incident started, and it was discovered that a coffin being carried by jet was over 30 kilometers away from the airport (Eddy et al., 1976). The jet’s rear cargo door had fallen from the airplane, and investigation showed that the door design made the door weak as it had a weak spot. The design by McDonnell Douglas designed the door to open outward, which was different from other designs where the doors opened inwards. The design was to increase the capacity for cargo carrying. The rear cargo design for the DC-10 plane is shown in figure 2 below.
Figure 2: DC-10 rear cargo door (Litch et al., 2019).
DC-10 aircraft has a troubled history, and this is one case study of crashes involving their aircraft. The accident was caused by the loss of their aircraft due to designs. The design of the cargo door did not promote the successful and safe locking of the door. The company’s technological caution policy has been blamed for the DC-10 accident cases and the financial problems that forced the company due to competition that led to the company cutting corners.
There were failures in the company’s ground testing that was done on the first DC-10 plane (Eddy et al., 1976). The rear cargo door in the testing done in May 1970 also flew open, and this depressurized the cargo compartment. After this test and the cargo door’s failure, the company neglected the door design, specifically hydraulic lines. Instead of carrying out more tests, McDonnell Douglas investigators concluded that the door was not locked properly (Eddy et al., 1976). It was unlikely that such a scenario will take place again. The crash in Detroit was similar, which raises ethical questions about the investigators and the company in general.
On the part of the FAA, there are also ethical issues as such a critical weakness could have been identified before the company was given certification to sell the planes (Eddy et al., 1976). The FAA’s fundamental weakness is highlighted by the fact that most of the certification testing is not conducted by their investigators but by the manufacturers themselves (Eddy et al., 1976). The FAA has been identified as a weak point in the process of aircraft development as the organization lacks expertise, workforce, and in some cases, skills to carry out the investigation.
Generally, airplane malfunctions are mostly discovered in most aircraft development and manufacture cases after major accidents involving airplanes. In the case of DC-10 planes by McDonnell Douglas, the design problem was seen at the testing period before any passenger had even boarded the plane. It is a fact that the hydraulic lines and the cargo door designs were not taken seriously.
The case is an engineering ethics problem because McDonnell Douglas and all professionals working in the company lost sight of their engineers’ responsibilities. According to Eddy et al. (1976), engineers need to take responsibility for their work’s consequences and play an active role in directing the work towards human ends. July 29, 1971, saw the FAA design engineers certify the DC-10 for use in commercial flights (Litch et al., 2019). Douglas failed to recognize the importance of engineering ethics in design as the focus was to increase the cargo space. Moreover, the FAA engineers and investigators at the organization failed to use engineering professional ethics. Overall, engineering ethics focuses on equity, fairness, honesty, and protection of the public’s safety, health, and welfare. All these aspects were not considered in the design of DC-10.
References
Eddy, P., Potter, E., & Page, B. (1976). Destination Disaster: From the Tri-Motor to the DC10. Times Newspapers, Ltd
Litch, J., Schaffer, M. & O’Brien, J. (2019). Behind Closed Doors: The DC-10 and the Demise of McDonnell Douglas. The Case Journal, 15(6). DOI: 10.1108/TCJ-04-2019-0028