Evaluating outcomes and consequences of war
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Consequences and causes of wars are a major concern for scholars in international politics, military studies, and public policy. War can happen regularly and can have great effects on international systems, groups, nations, and individuals; therefore, knowledge of the possible outcomes of the conflict is crucial for those who would want to utilize the logical models of conflict manipulations whereby a lot of attention is given to the effects and prevention of war. With the independence war in America and the pacific theater of war, scholars have attempted to use the behavioral and theoretical approach to explain their outcomes by looking at their birth or their causation, strategic stability, crisis, deterrence, and crisis management. They give insights into what could have triggered the cooperation in terms of cost and calculation of benefits, i.e., what may accompany a successful defection plan or coercion to cooperation. Scholars have sought to look into the consequences of war, both the desired and undesired, by looking at conflict as a public policy. Therefore, theoretical input in both wars should ascertain whether the outcomes of the wars were accompanied by their intended goals or no (von Clausewitz, 1873). War as an agent of social change should be acknowledged and studied to get sufficient and wholesome comprehension of social change itself. Theorist and war professionals look at the consequences of war at all levels and the variations involved at each level and characterized.
Among others, the three distinctive professionals writers on matters of war are Alfred Mahan, Sun Tsu, and Carl Clausewitz, who have formulated theories that could explain the outcomes of the war of independence in the United States and the Pacific Ocean theatre of war. Unlike his counterparts, Alfred Mahan’s theories are seemingly favorable and more applicable in the context of the two aforementioned confrontations due to several reasons. His naval theories and ideas, context, and operational concepts of war planning have been encoded in most world’s militaries. He is also considered an evangelist of the US’s sea strength.
First, in the context of the pacific theatre of war, his theory of maritime superiority is greatly manifested. Before invoking his theory of maritime supremacy, the United States was naturally a not sea-going country. With largely expansive landmass, she has always had the advantage of turning inward to exploit natural resources, which is well endowed with and therefore little need to venture into the sea. After buying into his ideas about sea power’s influence, the American government started to furnish her military strategies around the sea might. His theories dominated the naval curriculum in the United States. Having been able to capture the attributes of sea supremacy theories, the United States was able to equip herself to become one of the strongest naval powers before World War II (Mahan., 1890). From that basis, there are acts and scenes related to building battle fleets, amassing maritime commerce, and forward deployment of soldiers on a naval military basis. The best example of this is what transpired in the Pearl Harbor attack, a US port at Honolulu, in the territory of Hawaii. The attack on the port by the Japanese air navy service coded as ‘Hawaii operation’ was intended to deter the US military fleets from interfering with the planned offensive actions in southeast Asia against the United States’ overseas territories and other European allies. In anticipation of such events, President Roosevelt had transferred the pacific fleets from San Diego to Hawaii and ordered the deployment of marine contingents in the Philippines. Again, by 1930 the US navy had set up long-range submarines to attack Japanese warships. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US declared war with Japan the following day. The confrontation between the two countries was a culmination of the contention of the Mahan’s theories of sea supremacy. Japan had also tied to Mahan’s design sea supremacy before the attack. Japan’s entry into the war to fight alongside Nazi Germany had always been intimidated by the US’S naval threats and undertrained strength. They were aware that the US naval bases and strength’s strategic position could greatly thwart their war advancement to the Dutch East Indies and Malaysia and would not be able to launch their attacks effectively. Therefore, the attack was a deliberate action intended to prevent US naval fleets from interfering with their two countries’ attack. They also hoped to strengthen and fortify their naval capabilities in the Pacific waters by building more ships and positioning themselves. The attack happened without the official declaration of war by japan to the United States that was done intentionally to suppress the United States’ ability to mobilize its forces in the pacific (Mahan., 1890). On the Japanese side, borrowing Mahan’s theories’ insights had started to prepare the attacks a long way before launching the actual attacks. There was heavy deployment of Japanese naval contingents one year before the attack, in the wake of a full realization that unless they strengthened their command in the pacific, their attack and annex of the West Indies would not succeed.
Clausewitz and Sun Tsu failed to address the naval and sea supremacy issue in their theories of war, even though they point out the sea as a crucial element in warfare strategies and planning. There is no explicit acknowledgment of sea power strategy in their theories. In particular, Clausewitz dismisses the art of movement and maneuver, which are key tenants of naval strategies and tactics that were at play in the pacific theater of war and the war of independence in America, puts them in a position where their theories could not best use to explain the outcomes of the two wars. Clausewitz’s theories stress the usage of forces to exert economic pressures ashore by embargo and blockage rather than implementing offensive attacks.
The second reason why Mahan’s theories appear to be well-articulated in explaining the war of independence and theater of war in the Pacific Ocean is related to the interpretation of the effects of persistence, which is well set out in the two confrontations. In the independence war in America, the veterans took the war as an ideological and political revolution aimed at agitating for the states’ liberation from British rule and subsequently gain their independence. On the other hand, the British colonial forces were prepared to defend their position, given the economic foothold already established in terms of the taxes collected ready market of industrial goods. British were ready to deter any form of rebellion with necessary military forces and diplomatic efforts. When the objection of the imposition of taxes by the Stamp Act in 1765 by the British government in America flared up, the British sensed the possibility of war eruption. Owing to the knowledge and realization of the extent to which the effects of war would impact them, they receded and repealed the Stamp Act, and tension relaxed. However, the state’s colonial governments did not cease their quest for independence, looking forward to impending warfare’s positive effect through the earnest mobilization and grouping of the veterans. Once again, the British, 1767, with somewhat consideration of the impending unrest’s effects, imposed another tax by the Townshend act, which triggered civil unrest in Boston. By then, the British government was prepared for any eventuality and deployed military troops to control the unrest that led to a massacre. The unrest escalated with the important economic structures being destroyed, such as the Gaspee in Rhodesia in Rhode Island and a Boston tea factory. The British reacted by deploying the military to close the Boston harbor and enacted a series of deterrent laws. The consequent effect was realized upon some states calling for their independence through active coordination of armed resistance against the British rule in some states. More states organized themselves into the Patriot militias and continental armies that launched offensive attacks on the British troops. The confrontation between the two forces led to the capture of strategic structures such as port and cities from both sides. Extensive mobilization of sympathies ensued from sides ensued. The patriot and continental armies sought assistance from outside, with the French siding with them to reinforce their strength while the British targeted the groups of loyalists.
In his theories of war, Mahan alludes that warfare’s effects have to be analyzed to be perceived to determine the necessity of starting or joining a war. Both had to consider the effects that would persist for long those whose effects would last for a short time. There are those effects in the war’s independence war, while other war experienced shortly after the war. Both sides had to take up the consequences of the effects of war on production, as observed in the prewar trends, for example, the disruption of properties and displacement of people from their homes. Furthermore, there are those effects war extrapolated beyond the period of war, such as death. For example, many veterans lost lives, while the British military incurred huge casualties. When looking at war effect in the theatre of war in the Pacific Ocean, they were devastating and with effects that stretched far for a long period up to date. On the side of the United States, 2008, sailors lost their lives, and 327 soldiers and marines were killed, and countless numbers of injuries were afflicted, and the destruction of war machinery and ships. In total, about 1.2 million losses were incurred in casualties by the United States. In the retaliatory action, the United States unleashed military actions with huge effects to abruptly neutralize the Japanese hype for war and military strength. Activation of the atomic bomb on the Japanese strategic targets was highly considered. Hiroshima and Nagasaki towns were selected as the most suitable targets due to their strategic contribution to Japanese military strength. They were home key industries that produced weapons and intelligence resources. The bombing of the two cities killed nearly 30% of the population, about 70% was injured. The cities were completely damaged, with 69% of buildings destroyed after detonation of the bomb, to near-total destruction. In that case scenario, the war situation did not favor Japan to continue fighting with and indicated their will to surrender and withdraw from the war. Failure to which, the anticipated effects were projected collapse and total obliteration of japan as a nation. The easiest option was to surrender and yielded to the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.
The third reason why Mahan’s theories of war are more favorable in explaining both the independence of America and the theater of war Pacific Ocean is related to the classification of wars. The aspect can manifest itself by how the conflicting parties could determine the characteristics of their involvement in the war. Mahan asserts that determining the class of war helps figure out the consequences that are likely to occur and its degree. In a clear contrast by Clausewitz’s theory of trinity, he describes war as a complete process made up of the people’s tendencies, the military personnel, and the leadership class. He points out three elements of the trinity that combine to draw a pattern of behaviors to understand but not easy to predict. It is not easy to understand each of the three components of three paradoxical trinities (Von Clausewitz., 1873). Paradoxical trinity theory alleges that war is a phenomenon that is comprised of three central tendencies. The three elements are; hatred, violence, and enmity and the aspects and probability of play and subordination as an element of policy. The theory describes war as a stretch of policy informed by rational behaviors. It is ignited by characteristics that manifest themselves at the earliest stages, whereas the subordinated element of war is a political instrument that makes it subject to tenets of reason. Chance becomes a factor when occasioned by extremely threatening conditions. For a war to occur, each of the three triads must be expressed in society’s respective subject. The three elements of trinity form a unit of concepts drawn from several ideas joined by the logic of interacting, opposing facts. However, Mahan asserts that the timing of the impact of war may not be possible. Several consequences of war, such as social cohesion, are not realized immediately, which is felt long after the confrontations. Again the consequences of the selected method funding the war are severely felt the generations to come. For example, in the theater of war in the pacific ocean, the Japanese would not have been able to anticipate and prepare for the effects of the atomic bombs; either way, the effects of the atomic bombs were more dominant the innocent civilians and to the future generations in terms of psychological loss and other ground effects. In the war of independence in America, the effects trickled down to future generations. The freedom gained is felt more by future generations. Not even the veterans themselves, ratification of the constitution and independence declaration document is extensively conversant to the future generation than to the people who paid the ultimate price. Furthermore, the war left the country in fragile conditions of economic instability, which occasioned some spontaneous reactions that have had some effect today in the united states, such as the system of governance.
References
Mahan, A. T. (1890). The Influence of Seapower on History. New York.
Von Clausewitz, C. (1873). On war (Vol. 1). London, N. Trübner & Company.